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Abstract
We engage with Karen Barad’s notion of diffraction (2007) to re-evaluate the relations between 
mainstream contemporary art (MCA) and new media art (NMA)1 that have been discussed 
for many years as part of a somewhat contentious debate. Our diffractive reading highlights 
both large and small but consequential differences between these art practices. We do not 
smooth over the tensions highlighted in earlier discussions of NMA and MCA. Instead we use 
Barad’s term ‘entanglement’ to suggest that there are generative ‘entanglements’, as well as 
productive differences, between these practices. We extend the debate by considering which 
differences matter, for whom (artists, gallerists) and how these differences emerge through 
material-discursive intra-actions. We argue for a new term, diffractive art practices, and suggest 
that such art practices move beyond the bifurcation of NMA and MCA to partially reconfigure 
the practices between art, computation and humanities.
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1.  We note that terms such as new media art and mainstream contemporary art may be of little relevance anymore, however we use them as signposts for the 
fields drawing on their previous discussions.
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Prácticas artísticas difractivas: la informática y los complicados enredos 
entre el arte contemporáneo convencional y el arte de los nuevos medios
Resumen
Adoptamos la noción de difracción propuesta por Karen Barad (2007) para reevaluar las 
relaciones entre el arte contemporáneo convencional (ACC) y el arte de los nuevos medios 
(ANM), sobre las que se ha discutido durante muchos años como parte de un debate algo 
controvertido. Nuestra lectura difractiva pone de relieve diferencias, grandes y pequeñas 
pero consecuentes, entre estas prácticas artísticas. No suavizamos las tensiones puestas de 
relieve en anteriores debates acerca de ANM y MCA, sino que utilizamos el término de Barad, 
«enredo», para sugerir que existen «enredos» generativos, así como diferencias productivas, 
entre dichas prácticas. Ampliamos el debate considerando qué diferencias importan, para quién 
(artistas, galeristas) y cómo dichas diferencias emergen a través de intra-acciones materiales 
y discursivas. Propugnamos un nuevo término, «prácticas artísticas difractivas», y sugerimos 
que dichas prácticas artísticas van más allá de la bifurcación de ANM y MCA para reconfigurar 
parcialmente las prácticas entre arte, informática y humanidades.
Palabras clave
difracción, arte de los nuevos medios, investigación basada en la práctica, feminismos mate-
rialistas, teoría feminista, tecnociencia feminista
Introduction
 
In this paper we engage with Karen Barad’s diffractive methodologies 
(Barad, 2007) to suggest that there are productive and generative 
differences between practices of art. To re-evaluate the relations 
between them, we propose to read the fields of mainstream 
contemporary art (MCA) and new media art (NMA) diffractively. Our 
approach is not to bridge the gap (Cornell and Droitcour, 2013, p. 36). 
and is distinct from those seeking a rapprochement (Shanken, 2002) 
between NMA and MCA; therefore, this reading revises the position 
taken in Prophet’s paper The Artist in the Laboratory: Co-operating 
(T)reasonably (Prophet, 2011). We have confined ourselves here to a 
discussion of NMA and MCA rather than also addressing Sci-Art due 
to limitations of space. The diffractive reading we present develops 
a nuanced account of the intra-actions and deep entanglements of 
NMA and MCA. By reading the fields through each other, we intend 
to move beyond the often-quoted (Bishop, 2012) mutually exclusive 
domains of NMA and MCA, whilst retaining difference, variation and 
heterogeneity.
 
Diffractive methodology and optical metaphors
In this paper we use diffraction (Barad, 2007) as an optical metaphor 
to talk about art practices. Barad describes diffraction as a physical 
phenomenon that refers to the ways waves (water, light, sound) 
combine when they overlap. It points to the process of bending and 
spreading out that occurs when waves encounter obstructions. A 
familiar example is “the [visible] diffraction or interference pattern 
that water waves make when they rush through an opening in a 
breakwater or when stones are dropped in a pond and the ripples 
overlap” (Barad, 2007). Barad and Donna Haraway (Haraway, 1992; 
Gibbs, 1998), suggest that diffractions can be used as a useful 
counterpoint to the metaphor of reflection in technoscience practice 
(Barad, 2007) because they do not “place the same elsewhere” (Gibbs, 
1998). If we take the example of ripples that appear when stones 
are dropped into a pond, where dynamic and overlapping ripples 
change one another’s form, we can see that diffractive patterns are 
always in movement, a movement we are also situated within. We 
only see the differences of the water and the stones when they are in 
relation to one another, when the stone is thrown into the water and 
the ripple appears. By contrast the ‘bringing together’ implied by the 
term ‘rapprochement’ is harmonious and cordial, we wish to avoid 
any reading of NMA returning to MCA for reassurance or validation. 
Diffraction reveals the ways materialities emerge as differentiated 
events, as they come together, in relation to one another, and this 
includes the materiality of stone, water and the thrower. Whereas 
the common metaphor of reflection (discussed later) might be to 
‘look back onto’ arts practice, diffractive patterns manifest through 
reading practices through each other. In the metaphor of diffraction, 
diffractive patterns describe intra-actions and interferences (which 
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includes practices) from which different entities (which in this case 
might refer to art works, art theories, art practices) emerge. Barad 
uses the example of a physics experiment to show how small details 
in the experimental setup that are both material and discursive 
(material-discursive) cause different entities to emerge. We use the 
term difference as Barad does, to refer to the ways entities materialise 
as differently constituted, i.e. with different characteristics that are 
not absolute. By attending to diffractive patterns of difference we 
focus on what the differences are, how they matter, and for what and 
for whom, attending to the “relational nature of difference” (Barad, 
2007). In this paper we draw attention to the patterns of differences 
between NMA and MCA and highlight how those differences 
materialise through practices. Diffraction does not fix the object of 
study and the perceiving subject (the observer and observed) and 
they are no longer in opposition. A diffractive engagement allows 
for artworks to be either NMA or MCA or both simultaneously. In 
this paper we do not use difference to create clear boundaries 
between practices, but rather to map the material-arrangements 
that emerge from these differences, furthermore these differences 
are not fixed, with some works from MCA having the characteristics 
of NMA and vice versa as discussed later. The diffractive reading and 
writing process illuminates differences as they emerge, amplifying 
how such differences get made, revealing what gets included or 
excluded through practice, and prompting us to question how those 
exclusions matter.
Why diffraction?
 
Optical metaphors already have a well-established place in thinking 
about art practice, with reflection or ‘reflective practices’ (Gibbs, 
1998) often used when discussing visual art. Whereas reflection 
suggests a mirror image, or copy, diffraction invokes “patterns of 
difference rather than reflecting images” (Haraway, 1997). Over the 
last two decades the relationship between art and the academy has 
undergone marked shifts, specifically in the ways that arts practice 
has been packaged and redefined as practice-based research (Candy 
and Edmonds, 2002; Biggs, 2000; Arlander, 2008; Prophet, 2003; 
MacLeod, 2000; Sullivan, 2010) and has been measured periodically 
through exercises such as the Research Assessment Exercise or the 
Research Exercise Framework (REF, 2014). As part of this process, 
arts practitioners have adopted and adapted methods from other 
disciplines to articulate our research. This can be seen as a legacy 
of the widespread belief amongst cultural theorists and producers 
in the positive results of blurring (another optical metaphor) the 
boundaries between disciplines (Geertz, 2000). However, recent re-
evaluations of Clifford Geertz’s blurred genres highlight the problems 
of interpreting blurred genres as an exhortation to smoothing over 
differences between disciplines (Jay, 2012).
In scrutinising the relationships between MCA and NMA we 
have found it useful to read through texts of mirroring, blurring 
and reflecting (Schön, 1991), texts that argue for rapprochement 
(Shanken, 2002, Prophet, 2011)  and those that aim to dissolve 
perceived differences or separateness between practices of 
NMA and MCA (Harger, 2012). The underlying premise is that 
these spheres should be understood as more similar than is 
commonly held with texts often aiming for what Jay describes as 
the project of “harmonious reconciliation” (Jay, 2012) between 
the fields. Diffraction liberates us from this project, allowing us 
to let go of a focus on similarity, without suggesting that we take 
up a binary oppositional approach to considering NMA and MCA. 
Jay (2012) might sympathise with diffraction, as it allows for new 
types of complexity between or among those spheres as diffractive 
methodologies build on situated perspectives instead of proposing 
a separation of subject and object. Diffractive practices recognize 
the entanglements of subject and object, which Barad describes as 
“phenomena”. Therefore, diffraction as a process-based approach 
does not fix the object of study or subject in advance and allows for 
emergence in the research process. We suggest that such material 
feminist approaches offer a different way of accounting for the new 
and iterative material arrangements in art.
Barad introduces the optical metaphor of diffraction for re-thinking 
the relationships between entities and agencies that emerge from 
scientific practices. In this paper, we borrow from Barad to rethink 
and theorise about knowledge that emerges from art practices, using 
Barad’s metaphor of diffraction to show that different art practices 
continuously reconfigure the boundaries between them. Specifically, 
we look at NMA and MCA practices, suggesting that they are always 
in the process of being reconfigured, changing what they are and 
what they can be. The diffraction method allows us to interrupt the 
tendency to see MCA as a fixed and/or dominant frame of reference 
against which to read NMA, enabling us to focus our attention on 
the patterns of interference at the boundaries or overlaps of these 
practices. Geertz’s (2000) proposal of blurred boundaries between 
disciplines and genres, boundaries that urged social scientists to 
transgress, included an assertion that particular areas under scrutiny 
Fig. 1. Thomas Young’s sketch of two-slit diffraction, which he presented to the Royal Society 
in 1803. (Public domain)
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were “sites of complex interactions” (Jay, 2012). Barad extends this 
idea with her concept of entanglements. By looking at the ripple-
effect, studying the overlaps, we see how particular differences get 
made through entanglements of MCA and NMA practice. Rather than 
seeking to define new relations between media art and more general 
currents of contemporary art we account for the overlaps between 
MCA and NMA. These overlaps are always evolving and co-evolving; 
any boundaries between them are more porous than is commonly 
articulated yet not inconsequential. 
Diffraction and entanglement
Diffractive readings, across art practices, draw attention to on-
going temporal and spatial entanglements (Barad, 2007). For 
Barad, entanglement suggests that different entities (material-
configurations) interweave and entangle in an on-going process of 
intra-action, resulting in the production of new entities, comprising 
entangled groupings that, in turn, entangle with others (Barad, 2007). 
Entanglements are distinct from a blended mass of undifferentiated 
soup; this is not conflation (Hammarström, 2012). “Entanglement does 
not mean that what are entangled cannot be differentiated, discussed 
or remedied, only that the different entangled strands cannot be 
adequately dealt with in isolation, as if they were unrelated to the 
others”. In his preface to the 2000 edition of Local knowledge, Geertz 
(2000) writes that his intention is to “preserve the individuality of 
things and enfold them in larger worlds of sense at the same time”. 
In an intra-active understanding of the enfolding of entangled strands, 
strands are not self-subsistent entities, but are continuously and co-
constitutionally figured in and through their mutual interdependence 
(Hammarström, 2012). So-called characteristics of the sphere of NMA 
or of MCA (Coldwell, 2010), for example, materials, processes and 
physical form(s) become entangled in particular works, causing that 
work to cross-over from, say, NMA to MCA or to become contentious. 
This notion of crossing over reinforces the polarisation of NMA and 
MCA and we, therefore, suggest, instead, describing these as part of 
the interference patterns where NMA and MCA overlap. Artworks made 
using computation but instantiated in less copyable forms, like, for 
example, Julian Opie’s continuous digital animations on LCD screens 
are often sold in limited editions. Engaging with material-discursive 
context of auratic MCA, limiting the number of copies available exploits 
and counters the copyability of digital media. Therefore it could be 
said that Julian Opie’s work emerges neither because of, nor despite 
the boundary between MCA and NMA but as part of an interference 
pattern between MCA and NMA.
Through diffractive reading we pay attention to some of these 
sorts of entanglements, this attention recognises “we too are part of 
the world’s differential becoming” (Barad, 2007) this is not a case of a 
“knowing from a distance” (Barad, 2007). Diffractive methodologies 
build on situated perspectives (Jones, 2010; Haraway, 1992; Suchman, 
2007), however “the point is not simply to put the observer or knower 
back in the world (as if the world were a container and we merely 
needed to acknowledge our situatedness in it)” (Barad, 2007); instead 
they emphasise that instead of there being a separation of subject 
and object, they are entangled in “phenomena”. Objectivity, instead 
of being about offering an undistorted mirror image of the world, is 
about accountability and responsibility to the entanglements of which 
we are a part (Barad, 2007). We have found it useful to “map the 
effects” (Gibbs, 1998) of these entanglements as part of accounting 
for art practices that arise in the productive spaces of overlap between 
these recognized fields. We do not wish to reinstate an oppositional 
view of the two fields, but instead aim to examine the complex space 
of differentiated, but not polarised, practices through engaging with 
specific artworks.
Productive and material differences 
There has been much debate (Teasdale, 2013; Jones, 2013; Jackson, 
2012) about Claire Bishop’s idea (2012), previously articulated by 
Christina Albu (2011), that NMA and MCA are (still) mutually exclusive. 
While Bishop threw her “mind grenade into the contemporary art 
milieu” (Lichty, 2013), Albu’s assertion that “[n]ew media practices 
continue to remain in a separate sphere” was part of a discussion 
about potential hybridity between MCA and NMA. Many from NMA have 
applauded Bishop for spurring on the debate, while simultaneously 
voicing reservations about her article. Bishop decried artists for not 
“confront[ing] the question of what it means to think, see, and filter 
affect through the digital” (Bishop, 2012), and we note her assertion 
that, “the mainstream art world and its response to the digital are 
the focus of this essay”. She was explicitly not addressing NMA 
and saw it as a separate sphere. By taking this approach, Bishop 
perpetuated MCA’s position as the fixed, dominant frame of reference 
for NMA. As the debate grew, it expanded beyond simple refuting of 
Bishop by naming the names of artists that were involved in critical 
engagement with digital technologies and began to draw out the 
critical differences between MCA and NMA. This included discussion 
of the specific material arrangements of institutions including their 
histories, policies and funding as well as the form of their venues 
and events. However, the discussion largely adhered to the widely 
accepted practice of reading one text or set of ideas against another, 
again with MCA as the dominant frame of reference. Reading the 
same debate diffractively reveals, to an extent, what the discursive 
differences of MCA are and how they matter. This is especially clear 
in a re-reading of discussions of material characteristics of MCA 
that are caricatured in the debate, described as white walls, limited 
editions, wall-hung works, hand made, easily conservable, movable. 
NMA is also summarised through a set of physical and conceptual 
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characteristics authors note that interaction, code, screens, browsers, 
technologies with built-in obsolescence, shifting technical formats, 
projectors, specialist technical support, limitless copying, machine 
made, characterise the field. One of the differences discussed was 
digital artworks’ lack of “the comfort of materiality” (Stallabrass, 
2003) whereby many immaterial new media artefacts are copyable 
where “no one copy is better than any other, which may appear in 
many places at once, which may run out of the control of artists and 
curators and which are given as a gift. To the extent that online art is 
associated with the culture of Web 2.0 and the ‘wealth of networks’, 
it appears not merely dissociated from the mainstream market for 
contemporary art but dangerous to it” (Stallabrass, 2003).
Precisely which differences between NMA and MCA matter? In 
addition to those described above, a number of authors have pointed 
to the significance of NMA’s attention to the digital, interaction, 
complexity (Galanter, 2007), databases (Paul, 2014), code (Cox and 
Krysa, 2005) and MCA’s different focus on the material object (Paul, 
2007), participation (Paul, 2007; Teasdale, 2013). These differences 
matter for artists, their non-artist collaborators, collectors, dealers, 
gallerists and public funding bodies (Bishop, 2012). Differences matter 
in relation to issues (such as, but not limited to) built-in obsolescence 
and its impact on conservation and stability; the on-going value of 
auratic art and rarity values in the art market; the lower value assigned 
to art works that are copiable. The relationship between the moment 
in time when it is created, and the moment it is viewed also matters 
to the way a work of art (in whatever media) is received and the 
shifting contemporaneous meanings made of it (Baxandall, 1998). 
Just as the material-discourses around MCA change over time, so 
do those in NMA, for example, in 1969, the exhibition, Cybernetic 
serendipity (Reichardt, 1969), included prints and objects, but when 
NMA shifted focus to the virtual and interactive, physical objects 
and their conceptual concerns almost disappeared from the NMA 
exhibition circuit. Due to the histories and funding of NMA and its 
venues and festivals, works disseminated via NMA have tended to 
foreground computation and new technological arrangements, leaving 
artists open to the accusation that their works are technologically 
determined and not engaged enough with material-discourses 
of technology that include the political, aesthetical and ethical. 
Understanding the material constitutions of NMA and MCA helps 
us better understand their differences. In his response to Bishop, 
Teasdale notes, “a small but telling shift has occurred” and some 
artists have crossed-over from NMA to MCA, “because the work they 
make is physically – as well as virtually – based” (Albu, 2011). The 
importance of materiality is addressed by Bishop where she draws 
attention to the relationship between old media and its obsolescence. 
If one of the problems (Bishop, 2012) with NMA is its lack of material 
and its reproducibility, then there is a concurrent value to MCA works 
made with materials and technologies that are scarce, they become 
more precious and have greater value in an object-driven art market. 
By considering the specific qualities of the materials that constitute 
the objects, tools and forms of exhibitions, we suggest materiality 
changes the fields of MCA and NMA.
Although, as discussed, the boundaries of NMA and MCA are 
continuously emerging, being reformed, the prevalent material-
discursive context for curators, artists and institutions that self-
identify as being in NMA or MCA are surprisingly fixed, including 
and excluding particular materials and concepts. Paul notes “[t]he 
term new media has been used throughout the twentieth century for 
media that were emerging at any given time” and draws attention to 
the useful openness of this shifting definition of what new media is. 
We suggest that, concurrently, this fixation on the new led to a whole 
plethora of practices being excluded from debates about NMA. For 
example, until recently, specifically since the rise of maker and DIY 
culture, NMA debates have largely excluded practices that focus on 
objects such as digital photography, print-based works, craft, digital 
artworks or object-based installations that, while they may engage 
with technology, do not privilege computation. For instance, until very 
recently, NMA accommodated ALife and generative art, but it did not 
go so far as to embrace material representations that came out of 
systems and generative thinking, such as paintings made by machines 
(such as John F. Simon Junior, Harold Cohen/AARON). 
However, some artists sought to create new entanglements 
and new connections, leading to practices emerging ‘between’ the 
fields of NMA and MCA that engage with what is excluded from both 
fields. While such works have been described as in the so-called 
divide between the fields of NMA and MCA (Shanken, 2002; Bishop, 
2012), we suggest positioning these works differently, specifically 
as part of an interference pattern generated where ripples from both 
MCA and NMA converge. What is important for us in doing this is that 
interference suggests connection, exchange, collision and a degree 
of identification between forces whereas between fields implies a 
gap, a lost space, a lack of communication. Artists working through 
diffraction often deliberately make works that do not conform to the 
characteristics of NMA or MCA. As Prophet observed (2011), “The 
productive differences of positioning oneself outside of mainstream 
contemporary art has its ‘upsides’. 
To answer Claire Bishop’s rhetorical question, “how many 
[artists] really confront the question of what it means to think, 
see and filter affect through the digital?” (Bishop, 2012), we argue 
here that artists’ engagement with computation in NMA and MCA 
(and beyond) has significantly changed both fields, in both their 
exclusions and inclusions. Furthermore, these works engage with the 
material discourse, the role, impact and function of computation. For 
example, processes inherent to many computation-based artworks 
deny the promise of a stable object, requested by MCA. The 
engagement with the instability has formed a context for many 
works that inhabit the boundary zones of MCA and NMA. Indeed, 
the force of computational processes themselves can be seen as 
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forming ripples between NMA and MCA. For example, the work of 
artists Joan Heemskerk and Dirk Paesmans (JODI) in which the 
execution of source code in OSS/**** (1999) results in a takeover 
of the host computer. OSS?**** is an artwork fuelled by MCA’s 
anxieties and affinities to stability. During exhibitions OSS/**** 
was not presented in the gallery and instead visitors were invited 
to take home a CD-ROM, thereby removing the artwork from the 
exhibition space. The OSS/**** programs designed to be run on the 
visitor’s personal computer explore the different physical elements 
of the 1990s personal computers – the screen, the mouse and the 
keyboard. The work was executed through the installation of four 
programs, “#Reset;” or “% 20.” **** ***”and “000,0”. The programs, 
drawing on users’ data, transform the computer screen, making it 
unusable and in some instances irreparable. The lack of a static 
structure is inherent to the works’ materiality. OSS/**** comes into 
being dynamically, each time it is activated the outcome is different, 
rather than existing as a fixed entity. Works such as OSS/**** are 
always subject to interference from their own processes and 
utilise this instability deliberately. We suggest that the deliberate 
foregrounding of instability in OSS/**** is in itself an account of the 
dynamism of [art] practices and a recognition that practices “do 
not exist as static structures, nor do they merely unfold or evolve 
in space and time” (Barad, 2007).
While OSS/**** attends to the material qualities of instability 
through the development of bespoke software of executed programs 
and the physical interfaces of mouse, screen and keyboard, LoVid 
draws attention to the entanglement of software and hardware in 
LoVid 486 Shorts, a video installation in which 486 short clips of a 
circuit short are screened. To make the work, LoVid opened an archaic 
486 computer and wired a short circuit onto the hardware of the video 
card. As “[c]onnections were made on the circuit board of the video 
card, using wire to produce short videos. Recordings made from these 
shorts were then edited into 486 Shorts short clips, each corresponding 
to one of the physical shorts.” (Hinkis and Lapidus, 2006). LoVid 486 
Shorts makes visible the intra-active entanglement of hardware and 
software and the ways in which they mutually constitute each other, 
rather than existing as separate entities (software running on an 
unaffected hardware). Running code in LoVid 486 Shorts reconfigures 
the materiality of the 486 Shorts hardware, producing videos by 
destroying the computer video card. 486 Shorts visualises a set of 
interferences between hardware, software and art that brings the 
materiality of computation to our attention.
John F. Simon Junior’s Flip (2014) addresses the material that 
encapsulates hardware and software, referencing the casing of old 
media. Flip comprises seven wooden cabinet relief works incorporating 
LCD screens that display his abstract generative images. The MCA 
critic Walter Robinson described the Flip works “[s]uggesting Mid-
Century Moderne, the cabinets are multi-coloured and inscribed 
with elaborate, laser-cut decorations [...] As someone who came of 
age during the Conceptual Art era, my first impulse was that all the 
additional meanings that Simon had layered onto his ‘pure’ code were 
extraneous. ‘Everything is code’, the artist explained. ‘And there are 
lots and lots of codes’”. Despite his apparent MCA focus, for Robinson 
the computer code running to generate images is unproblematic, not 
a NMA issue. It is a process that is part of, and dependent on, long 
running material-discursive contexts from Conceptual Art’s older, but 
still relevant, discourses about the removal of the decorative. However, 
Robinson also situates Flip in the material-discursive context of the 
2008 Whitney Biennial, which Robinson defines as “about décor” 
Robinson (2008).
These material-discursive contexts of MCA in New York, from 
the 1960s through to 2008 form ripples when they meet material-
discursive contexts from NMA. Computation such as the operating 
system, speed, and the types of screens Simon uses, impact the 
way the work emerges and makes it inherently unstable, like much 
NMA.
The works described above are more-than simply linear and 
time-based. Qualitatively different from works that are said to unfold 
in time in a predictable manner, they demonstrate how computational 
processes continuously differentiate over space and time. The code 
running is a process that is often part of, and dependent on, larger 
material-discursive contexts (the operating system, speed, etc.) 
all of which potentially impact the way the code runs and make it 
inherently unstable. Artists such as JODI, Simon Junior and LoVid treat 
computation as “always something more than mere matter” (Coole 
and Frost, 2010). They bring attention to the matter and practice of 
material, recognizing our on-going intra-actions with computation. 
These works transform iteratively, in what Barad describes as a 
space-time mattering where the code’s material dynamism is 
implicated in its production. However, works that engage with 
the dynamics of code practices, have often been excluded from 
much MCA. MCA has excluded computation-based works from the 
MCA cannon precisely because they engage with, perpetuate and 
depend upon unstable processes (Bosma, 2011) that are seen as 
being at odds with MCA’s preferences for fixed and stable objects, 
they do not easily fit in “[an art] market that prefers and privileges 
auratic forms” (Bishop, 2013). While MCA has embraced so-called 
relational art (Paul, 2007) and video art, the stability of the work 
remains important. Here it is worth noting that the stability of media 
is important to the MCA market when applied to materials such as 
paper and paint as well as the digital or immaterial. By considering 
the specific qualities of the materials that constitute the objects, tools 
and forms of exhibitions, we suggest how matter changes the fields 
of MCA and NMA themselves. Such mattering (Barad, 2007) creates 
new forms of practice that engage with art and other practices, like 
science, media, ecology, education to name a few, and we see this, 
for example, in the emergent space of sci-art, bio-art, software art, 
mixed methods, post-digital practice, art and environment.
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How differences get made
Many NMA works engaging with computation are about practice. As 
Marcos Novak states, “I would define [NMA] through its engagement 
with certain technologies that haven’t existed before and in terms 
of how one approaches these technologies. What characterises it is 
that instead of making the thing, the way a potter makes a pot by 
direct interaction with the material, there is a degree of indirection. 
Instead of making the thing you set the motion into process and the 
process makes the thing” (Jennings, 2000). This emphasis on practice, 
common to many NMA works, is another reason why it is useful to 
use Barad’s ideas, as in her theorising for diffraction she provides a 
way to account for practices and processes that materialise objects. 
Moreover, she emphasises the practices and processes that come 
before the object (Barad, 2007). In NMA, where many of the artworks 
are process based, the practice and the process are often conflated 
with the object. When Bishop wrote that “the digital, by contrast [to 
photography and film], is code, inherently alien to human perception” 
(Bishop, 2013), she was rebuffed by Harger who reminded us that 
“[code is] certainly not alien to the humans – who are, it should 
be noted, often artists – that write it.” Bishop’s argument relies on 
differentiating code from the artworks it relates to, to the extent that 
code is presented as being in opposition to, in contrast to the artwork. 
In the material-discursive context of NMA, code (and computation) 
are inherent to the art that emerges with them, they are “constitutive 
elements of material processes” (Gabrys, 2011). By focusing on code, 
Bishop was considering a specific material that is central to the 
constitution of many objects, tools and forms of exhibitions in NMA. 
While we agree with Harger that that code is not alien, we also think 
that Bishop was onto something with her description. In relation to 
the materials and processes of film and photography, the particular 
qualities of computation (one of which is code), are seemingly alien 
or inhuman, “the humanly un-thinkable” (Barad, 2007).
 
Conclusion: diffractive practices
The topologies of NMA and MCA have iteratively changed, have been 
continually emerging, throughout the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries. As a result of matter’s dynamism (Barad, 2007), the fields of 
NMA and MCA have excluded as much as they have included. MCA and 
NMA works are configurations of entangled relations, entanglements 
that create temporal, spatial relations with each other and with 
processes and practices from other disciplines. Bishop (2012) and 
Stallabrass (2013) have described boundaries between disciplines 
as less permeable, others have described their practices as relational 
(Bourriaud, 2002), collaborative, interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary 
(Prophet and Inverno, 2006; C. Frost, 2012), after new media (Graham 
and Cook, 2010), or post digital (Gansing, 2013; Andersen et al., 
2013). We suggest that material feminisms offer a different way of 
accounting for the new and iterative material arrangements that have 
emerged from computation’s entanglements with art. Specifically, 
after Barad (2007), we suggest the term diffractive art practices to 
understand the “always-already” entangled practices of art, namely 
the entanglement of material practices and the entanglements of the 
ways we articulate the practices of art and the practices themselves. 
These entanglements can be understood as emerging from the 
patterns of interference that are sometimes revealed through artworks.
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